Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, if you have the answer

to the chairman’s questions, you will win the Nobel Peace

Prize. We have to get you an answer in the administration too.

What is the Congress willing to do?

I recall having a meeting with the newly organized and—how

could I say—unified Iraqi opposition leadership that met in the

United States, and all of us sat there with them. We were interested,

a bunch of us—I do not know—8, 10, 12 Senators and talked

about how we had to do more. I raised the following question.

I said, if we go ahead and implement the Iraqi Liberation Act

with funding available to us and these folks who constitute the opposition—

and they are varied in their backgrounds—if they begin

to move and they are pinned down—I asked this particular leader

of the group, who I will not mention now because it was a private

meeting, I said, look out at each of these Senators. Ask how many

are willing to vote to send American troops if you are pinned down.

I said, I commit to you I will. I did not notice another hand raised

in that meeting. Not one other hand.

So, it seems to me that we have a big problem. Saddam is the

problem. Saddam is in place. Saddam is not going anywhere unless

we do something relatively drastic. It is clear our allies are not prepared

to do anything drastic. As a matter of fact, it is clear, on the

part of the French and others, they would rather essentially normalize

the relationship. So, we have got a big problem.

And any insight you can give us as to why we are not doing

more—I too am confused as to what we seem to be in the administration—

you seem to be taking the position which is essentially if

you cannot fight them, join them. That is, our friends who say that

the problem is the sanctions. I do not agree with that.

So, at any rate, I am anxious to hear your testimony, and I hope

that we can generate enough backbone here in the Congress, as

well as enough leadership in the administration, to come up with

a consensus policy as to what we should do.

No. That is right. They were not.

I have no questions.

I have one question. The inspection regime is a

pale shadow of what it was initially. We supported it I assume because

there was not much of an alternative. What impact has our

support for supporting the alternative—the 1284—not alternative

to it, not that there was one. Maybe you can speak to that as well.

But what impact has that had on our ability to maintain what

sanctions remain on Saddam, any unity in that? Is there any correlation

or connection between the administration’s decision to vote

for 1284 and sanctions?

No, I know that. My point is—let us get right to

it. Had we voted the other way, what would have happened in

terms of the maintenance of sanctions? Was there any deal? Was

there any tradeoff here implicit that if you did not support what

is 1284, which is not as robust—it has all the same verbiage, but

you and I both know it is not nearly as robust as UNSCOM was.

Was it anticipated that that would allow us to maintain support for

the sanctions? Or had we not supported it, did we conclude it

would make it more difficult to maintain consensus on sanctions?

I understand. I guess maybe that is what is

wrong with the U.N. We do not think about things.

It seems to me, having been up there recently, that you have a

real problem maintaining sanctions. I assume you all were—were

I in that position, I would be conniving enough to hope that I would

come up with an inspection policy that was not as good as before,

but a hell of a lot better than anything we have, anticipating he

will not go along with it. And if he does go along with it initially,

he will breach it again, which then gives us the moral credibility

to argue that this guy is a bad guy. He is showing it time and

again, and he is making weapons of mass destruction. He is trying

to hide from us, and you cannot lift sanctions.

I realize there is no direct relationship, but I do not know why

the hell you guys in the State Department do not speak English.

I do not know why you do not speak frankly. But I am not going

to try to help you anymore. You are on your own.

I agree with that.

My closing question is this. If the Security Council

members try to weaken 1284, in an attempt to gain his acquiescence,

will the administration permit and vote for further compromises,

or will it hold firm to the text as it now stands?

That means we would not——

Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, may I have 10 seconds or 30 seconds?

I would like to mildly demur in the statement the chairman just

made about what you have to bring to us first. If by that we mean

you should be consulting us privately and letting us know what the

outlines of an agreement may be, that I agree with completely. And

to the best of my knowledge, you have been doing that. You have

been doing that with me anyway, and I suspect you have been

doing that with other people.

If you mean that you have to present to us first the outlines of

what the final deal would be and what part we would be willing

to play before you get agreement between the Israelis and, in this

case, the Syrians, then I think that is totally impractical. I do not

know how you would do that. I do not know how that can be done.

We will have, obviously, a vigorous debate on, if the outlines as

have been set to me, are roughly what is agreed to, hopefully, by

Israel as part of an Israeli/Syrian agreement, which is not done yet,

but if that were to be done and the outline of our participation, as

has been sketched out to me and others, then it will. It will get my

support, but I am sure it will get vigorous debate.

But I want to make it clear I do not think you should be coming

to the Congress ahead of time with the detail before in this incredibly

delicate process of playing the third party role of trying to

bring two folks together who have not spoken to each other for a

long, long time. But again, I think it would be wise to inform the

chairman—you probably have already—if you have not, of the general

outlines of what you think it may look like. But I just want

to make sure I am on the record as to understanding what I mean

by what your consultation is.

Mr. Chairman, I may be wrong, but I think the

leadership of your party has been consulted, the senior members

have. I may be mistaken.

What year was this? Excuse me. What year was

this you are talking about?

In 1990. That is what I thought. Thank you.

In 1990 the State Department denied it as well.

Thank you for the clarification.

Why do you say that? How do you reach that conclusion?

Every time the Secretary speaks, every time the

President speaks they say that.

I do not disagree with anything any of you said

except none of you have a damn solution. You do not have any idea

of what you are talking as to what to do from here. You are right

in the criticism. I think the criticism is dead right. We made a fundamental

mistake that everybody underestimated when George

Bush stopped us going into Baghdad. One of the things no one figured

was that it would be read as a conclusion that possession of

or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons would hold off the

giant. And that is the reason why he did not occupy Baghdad is

because we had these weapons, thereby emboldening them to hang

onto them closer. So, a fundamental mistake. It is easy to Monday

morning quarterback now and say it, but a fundamental mistake

made. And we continue to make mistakes as we go along.

But the bottom line to me is how do you hold this together. You

say, for example, Mr. Leventhal, that we seem to conclude a further

military confrontation is not worth it. How the hell do you

draw that conclusion? If you conclude that, there is not a consensus

in America or the Congress or the President can come and go unilaterally

into Iraq, you are right.

But you make basically irresponsible statements in a very responsible

presentation. Every factual thing you have said—I cannot

think of a single factual point you have made that I have disagreed

with.

Now you are sitting there and here you go. Vote around the Security

Council. They turned down our guy. OK. You do not have

the votes for our guy. You have got to have enough votes to get this

done. Now what we do is we nix Blix. No pun intended. I am not

attempting to be humorous here. We say no, we are not going with

Blix. Now we have no inspection regime. None. We do not get any

vote for any inspection regime.

My question is, is that better than none?

Well, let us just say that. So, it would be better

not to have anything. Is that what you are saying?

What do you feel? I can figure out what they figure

out, but what do you think? What do you think is better?

No, no. That is not my question. My question is—

it comes time to vote. You think Blix is weak. I think he is weak.

We are in agreement. Now you are sitting there with the Ambassador

to the United Nations, recommend. He turns to you, recommend.

How do I vote? How do you vote?

Oh, Blix, come on. You know no matter what Blix

says, this man here is right. Come on. Let us stop kidding each

other. We are all grown-ups here. If the Security Council is not

willing to go to the mat and if our allies are not willing to suit up

again and go in and go to Baghdad, we are just playing games. You

know it and I know it. And you are playing a game here with me,

with all due respect.

How do you vote?

By the way, the IAEA, when Blix was doing it,

did not have nearly the authority allegedly available here. Do you

support the new protocol for the IAEA?

Yes. Do you support that?

I did not say it was. You are sounding like a

State Department guy. Come on.

Do you support the increase? Do you support the

change in the protocol, increasing inspection regimes? Which most

of my conservative friends in Congress do not support, by the way.

I am speaking of IAEA.

Yes, 93 plus 2.

Yes.

I am not saying that. I am asking you would you

like to see it universally applied? Would you like to see it part of

the IAEA’s authority?

And you think it should be able to. Right?

Now, you are a very wise observer of this place.

Do you think that we could get that through here? Do you think

we could get that passed here?

Now, come on. Answer my question, please. Do

you think that it is possible to amend the treaty along the lines you

suggested and get it passed here in the U.S. Senate? What do you

think?

You really should have a job at the State Department,

sir. I am an admirer of yours. I think what you say is good.

You are just as duplicitous as they are, though, in not answering

the questions.

What do you think?

But you know they are not our friends in this.

Come on.

I agree there is not. There never is.

Just said no and no inspection. Right? I am not

disagreeing with you. I want to know.

I am not disagreeing with you. I just want to

know.

Right. You would have insisted on a Ekeus and

you would have not gotten Ekeus. There is no possibility you would

have gotten Ekeus. There is no indication anything in past is prologue.

There is no indication you would ever be given Ekeus. In foreign

policy decisions made by governments on the Security Council,

it never is based upon a Ekeus to be made. It is based upon national

self-interest. Their self-interest, they view, is different than

ours. They would vote no.

I tend to agree with you. No inspection would be better than this

one. But that is all I am trying to get you to say.

Good.

Got you.

Gentlemen, I truly appreciate your input on this.

I do not mean to be argumentative with you. The part that bothers

me about all of this is that what we all pretend is there is an answer.

You guys have no more of an answer than that table is going

to get up and fly. We have cited the problem. Now what do we do?

Well, Mr. Chairman, I really do not——

By the way, I think you are right. I do not disagree

with that. But my experience, after 28 years doing this, is

big nations cannot bluff. Big nations cannot bluff.

I am ready to introduce a resolution with you that if they, in

fact, refuse the inspections, you and I will introduce a resolution

calling for the use of force by the United States of America if we

have to do it alone to go after Saddam Hussein.

Good, because absent that, the rest of this is malarkey,

guys. You know it and I know it. Stop playing your intellectual

games.

You are much smarter than that in my observation.